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Corporate Purpose in a Populist Era
ABSTRACT
In the wake of the 2016 U.S. presidential election and similar devel-
opments in parts of Europe, commentators widely acknowledged the
rise of populist movements on both the right and left of the political
spectrum that were deeply suspicious of big business. This development
potentially has important implications for the law and practice of cor-
porate purpose.
Left-of-center corporate social responsibility campaigners have long
advocated the use of “boycotts, shareholder activism, negative public-
ity, and so on” to pressure corporate managers to act in ways those
campaigners deem socially responsible. Right-of-center populists could
use the same tactics to induce corporate directors to make decisions
they favor. The question thus is whether they are likely to do so based
on their historical track record.
Assuming for the sake of argument that right-of-center populists be-
gin focusing on corporate purpose, the question arises whether modify-
ing the shareholder wealth maximization norms to give managers
more discretion to take the social effects of their decisions into account
would lead to outcomes populists consider desirable. Populists histori-
cally have viewed corporate directors and managers as elites opposed
to the best interests of the people. Today, right-of-center populists find
themselves increasingly at odds with an emergent class of social justice
warrior CEOs, whose views on a variety of critical issues are increas-
ingly closer to those of blue state elites than those of red state populists.
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It’s a great honor to be with you to give the Roscoe Pound Lecture.1
Although I can’t help wondering whether Pound would have approved
of my topic for today. After all, Pound was no fan of populism. But, on
the other hand, Pound famously saw the law as a means of attaining a
better society, using the law as a means of social engineering in the
service of important values. The question I want to pose today is
whether modern populists might use the law—specifically the law of
corporate purpose—in service of what they regard as important social
values.
At the outset, I must warn you that there is not a lot of law in what
follows. I take some comfort, however, from the fact that Roscoe
Pound’s famous 1906 speech on The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice was much more concerned with the
political and social roots of that dissatisfaction than with technical
legal questions. As I think about it, perhaps I should have entitled my
Article The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Corporation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly before the November 2016 presidential election, United
Technologies Corporation (UTC) CEO Gregory Hayes defended the
firm’s decision to close an Indiana furnace factory operated by its Car-
rier Corporation subsidiary and transfer production to a factory in
1. Professor Bainbridge delivered the annual Roscoe Pound Lecture on March 27,
2019 at the University of Nebraska College of Law. His lecture, Corporate
Purpose in a Populist Era, was based upon this Article.
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Mexico.2 In doing so, Hayes was responding to repeated public criti-
cism of the decision by then-presidential candidate Donald Trump.3
Although Hayes claimed the decision had not been taken lightly, the
decision was part of Hayes’s on-going pursuit of shareholder wealth
maximization.4 While the Indiana plant was profitable, it simply was
not profitable enough to meet Hayes’s goals, especially when com-
pared to Carrier’s highly profitable Mexican plants.5 Once Trump was
elected President, Hayes backtracked and agreed to keep the plant
open, but continued to insist that, “as for the initial decision to close
the plant, ‘we did the right thing for the business.’”6
Would UTC’s board have reached the same initial decision if it had
considered the effect it would have on the plant’s workers and the
community in which they lived? What if the board had been required
to do so? Put another way, does the purpose of corporations like UTC
really require CEOs like Hayes to do whatever is necessary “to in-
crease shareholder value . . . no matter how difficult”?7 If so, should it?
To be sure, the business judgment rule gives directors a substan-
tial amount of discretion with respect to making decisions like the
ones made by UTC’s board.8 Both the original decision to close the
plant and the decision to backtrack on the closing doubtless would
have been protected by the business judgment rule.9 But while the
business judgment rule may give the board legal protection, it does
2. Bryan Gruley & Rick Clough, Remember When Trump Said He Saved 1,100 Jobs
at a Carrier Plant? Well, Globalization Doesn’t Give a Damn, BLOOMBERG (Mar.
29, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-03-29/remem
ber-when-trump-said-he-saved-1-100-jobs-at-a-carrier-plant [https://perma.unl
.edu/BR3J-UXJT].
3. See id. (“For months [Trump] blasted Carrier in tweets and at rallies.”).
4. See id. (“Whatever we need to do to increase shareholder value, [Hayes said,] we
will do those things, no matter how difficult.”).
5. See id. (quoting Hayes to the effect that the Indiana plant was less profitable
than the Mexican facilities).
6. Id.
7. See id. (“Whatever we need to do to increase shareholder value, [Hayes said,] we
will do those things, no matter how difficult.”). For discussion of the “Carrier
deal,” see Steven Davidoff Solomon & David Zaring, Transactional Administra-
tion, 106 GEO. L.J. 1097, 1110–12 (2018).
8. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1979) (“The business
judgment rule applies to all discretionary decisions by the board . . . .”), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 710
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“The common law ‘business judgment rule’ refers to a judi-
cial policy of deference to the business judgment of corporate directors in the ex-
ercise of their broad discretion in making corporate decisions.”).
9. See Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment
Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 649 (2002) (observing that “the types of decisions
ordinarily given business judgment rule protection” include “directors’ decisions
to make an acquisition or build a new plant”); Omari Scott Simmons, The Corpo-
rate Immune System: Governance from the Inside Out, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1131,
1159 (2013) (“Most routine operational decisions, such as the decision to build a
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not define the scope of the board’s fiduciary duty.10 That task is the
job of the law of corporate purpose.
At least in Delaware, the law of corporate purpose is well settled in
favor of shareholder wealth maximization.11 Directors have a fiduci-
ary duty to sustainably maximize shareholder wealth over such time
horizon as the board deems fit.12 Numerous Delaware cases have so
held.13 True, many commentators have sought to explain away or oth-
erwise distinguish these decisions, but as Delaware’s sitting Chief
Justice has explained in detail, “these commentators essentially argue
that Delaware judges do not understand the very law they are
applying.”14
foreign production plant or what products to produce, are protected under state
law through the business judgment rule.” (footnote omitted)).
10. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 95–100 (2004) (arguing that the business judgment rule is
not a standard of liability but rather an abstention doctrine).
11. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Criti-
cal Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1702 (2002) (“Delaware, at least,
has apparently decided that the principal-agent model, and with it the share-
holder primacy norm, is superior to alternative models of corporate governance.”);
David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 184
(2013) (“Delaware demands shareholder primacy in corporate governance.”). I
have elsewhere insisted not to use the terms “shareholder primacy” and “share-
holder wealth maximization” interchangeably because the former encompasses
both the latter and a claim that shareholders do (or should) control the corpora-
tion. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence
Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45, 47 (2002). I therefore agree with David Yosifon’s
argument that “[w]e should stop using the term ‘shareholder primacy’ to refer to
both purpose and means. It inhibits clear expression and exchange of ideas.”
DAVID YOSIFON, CORPORATE FRICTION: HOW CORPORATE LAW IMPEDES AMERICAN
PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1 n.1 (2018).
12. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit
Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012) (observing
that “corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pur-
sue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders”).
13. See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“Direc-
tors of a Delaware corporation owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
stockholders which require that they strive prudently and in good faith to maxi-
mize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants.”); eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (stating that
“the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany [the corporate] form . . . in-
clude acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stock-
holders”); TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acq. Corp., No. CIV. A. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL
20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (stating that it is “non-controversial” that,
“broadly, directors may be said to owe a duty to shareholders as a class to manage
the corporation within the law, with due care and in a way intended to maximize
the long run interests of shareholders”).
14. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understand-
ing of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 766–67 (2015). See also
Yosifon, supra note 11, at 184 (arguing that “the black letter law of corporate
governance is shareholder primacy” and identifying “the missteps that . . . other
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The policy arguments cannot be described as well settled, of
course, because numerous commentators have staked out positions on
every conceivable side of the issue.15 It is nevertheless fair to say that
the policy arguments have been beaten to death. There is a volumi-
nous literature on the subject to which every generation of scholars
seems compelled to add their two cents.16
This longstanding debate, however, could now play out in a radi-
cally different political environment. On the right, the rise of the Tea
Party began a shift in the Republican party towards populism,17
which the 2016 election of Donald Trump as President strength-
ened.18 On the left, Bernie Sanders’s strong performance in the 2016
Democratic presidential primaries and the surging popularity of Sena-
tor Elizabeth Warren likewise signaled a populist shift in the Demo-
scholars have made in interpreting that doctrine”). For an extended analysis of
Delaware law on the issue, which concludes that shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion is the legal standard, see YOSIFON, supra note 11, at 60–95.
15. See Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance
Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 71 (2010) (“Over
the course of the past century, the famous debate between Adolph Berle and Mer-
rick Dodd in the Harvard Law Review over the nature and purpose of the corpo-
ration has been traced and retraced in a pendulum swing between two
fundamental positions.”).
16. See Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judg-
ment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 435 (2013) (observing that
“the normative debate has gone on for decades and shows no signs of abating”).
17. It is important to note the distinction between Populism spelled with a capital “P”
and populism spelled with a lower-case “p.” See John F. Cooper, The Citizen Initi-
ative Petition to Amend State Constitutions: A Concept Whose Time Has Passed,
or a Vigorous Component of Participatory Democracy at the State Level?, 28 N.M.
L. REV. 227, 230 (1998) (“While Populism with a capital ‘P’ describes a short-lived
American political party that functioned during the last decade of the Nineteenth
Century, populism with a lower case ‘p’ represents an American political move-
ment that owes its maturation to the political beliefs of Thomas Jefferson, but
which predates even the American Revolution.” (footnote omitted)). This Article
is concerned with populism spelled with the lower-case “p.” As a definition of the
latter, I adopt herein Mark Roe’s characterization of it as the “widespread atti-
tude that large institutions and accumulations of centralized economic power are
inherently undesirable and should be reduced, even if concentration is produc-
tive.” MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 29 (1994).
So defined, populism is not an ideology and is not describable as inherently
right, left, or center. JOHN B. JUDIS, THE POPULIST EXPLOSION: HOW THE GREAT
RECESSION TRANSFORMED AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POLITICS 14 (2016). Instead,
populism is a worldview that sees corrupt elites standing in opposition to ordi-
nary people. Id. Having said that, however, it is a worldview embraced by people
on both sides of the political spectrum and deployed for their various political
purposes. See id. at 15 (contrasting right-wing and left-wing populism).
18. See MUGAMBI JOUET, EXCEPTIONAL AMERICA: WHAT DIVIDES AMERICANS FROM THE
WORLD AND FROM EACH OTHER 74 (2017) (criticizing the populism of “the Tea
Party and Trump movements”).
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cratic party.19 Given these political trends and the underlying
economic ills driving them, the question arguably “is no longer
whether populist pressure will have a strong influence on policy deci-
sions but how.”20
In the wake of Trump’s election, The Economist magazine’s
Schumpeter column provocatively asked whether this new political
environment necessitates rethinking corporate purpose:
As they slid down the streets of Davos this week, many executives will have
felt a question gnawing in their guts. Who matters most: shareholders or the
people? Around the world a revolt seems under way. A growing cohort—per-
haps a majority—of citizens want corporations to be cuddlier, invest more at
home, pay higher taxes and wages and employ more people, and are voting for
politicians who say they will make all that happen.
. . . Should [corporate managers] fire staff, trim costs and expand abroad—
and face the wrath of Donald Trump’s Twitter feed, the disgust of their chil-
dren and the risk that they’ll be the first against the wall when the revolution
comes? Or do they bend to popular opinion and allow profits to fall . . . ?21
The columnist proceeded to focus on how directors and managers will
respond to the shifting political winds. Yet, because I assume the law
both reflects and shapes social norms and attitudes, the column
prompted me to wonder whether the populist movement might also
impact the debate over the law of corporate purpose, which motivated
this Article.
In thinking about the potential legal implications of Schumpeter’s
questions, three issues immediately presented themselves. First, what
is the populist critique of business and corporations? Second, would
populists regard changing the law of corporate purpose as a viable
means of operationalizing that critique? Finally, would changing that
law prove a useful vehicle for advancing populist goals?22
A significant obstacle to answering these questions is the lack of
deep intellectual thought among modern populists (pace Senator War-
ren). This is especially true of populists on the right, of which anti-
intellectualism has become a distinguishing characteristic. Indeed, as
leading conservative thinker—and fierce critic of populism—Russell
Kirk observed, modern populist movements are “a revolt against the
Smart Guys.”23
19. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, LAW PROFESSORS: THREE CENTURIES OF SHAPING AMERI-
CAN LAW 466 (2017) (discussing whether Sanders and Warren will be able to per-
suade the public that they are “bona-fide populists”).
20. LUIGI ZINGALES, A CAPITALISM FOR THE PEOPLE: RECAPTURING THE LOST GENIUS
OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY 115 (2012).
21. Six Sects of Shareholder Value, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www
.economist.com/business/2017/01/21/businesses-can-and-will-adapt-to-the-age-of-
populism [https://perma.unl.edu/TUG2-2Q2J].
22. Note that these are “is” rather than “ought” questions. My project here is not to
decide either whether changing corporate purpose is a good idea or whether the
populist agenda has merit.
23. RUSSELL KIRK, THE POLITICS OF PRUDENCE 144 (1993).
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It was not always so, however. In several prior populist periods,
populist intellectuals devoted considerable energy to thinking about
the role of business in society, the rise of the corporate form as the
dominant form of business organizations, and other topics that bear
directly on the debate over corporate purpose.24 It is to those sources
that we therefore must turn.25 Even so, however, we know much more
about what populists opposed than what they proposed.26 Much of
what follows is therefore inferential and conjectural.
Part II of this Article begins with a very brief history of anti-corpo-
rate populism, emphasizing the aspects of populist thought pertinent
to corporate governance.27 As noted above, populism does not easily
map to the traditional left-right schema of American politics.28 Never-
theless, this Article focuses on those populist movements generally
identified as being right-of-center, partly because of their 2016 success
and partly as a matter of personal interest.29 As a conservative legal
academic who focuses on business law, the history of right-of-center
populists as leading conservative critics of business has been a matter
of considerable interest.
Part III turns to the question of whether a resurgent populist
movement is more likely to focus on corporate purpose than to di-
recting its attentions elsewhere. Left-of-center corporate social re-
sponsibility campaigners have long advocated the use of “boycotts,
shareholder activism, negative publicity, and so on” to pressure corpo-
24. Right-of-center populism differs from the laissez-faire, pro-business strands of
conservative and libertarian thought in that the latter tends to identify with bus-
iness elites rather than lower classes such as workers, shopkeepers, the poor, and
the middle class. See JUDIS, supra note 17, at 15 (describing focus of center-right
populism).
25. It must be acknowledged at the outset that many of the populist writers dis-
cussed herein held views—especially on race—that are highly repugnant. This is
hardly surprising, given that populism was “one of the nastiest of American polit-
ical movements.” F.H. Buckley, Conservatism: Trump and Beyond, MOD. AGE
(Spring 2018), https://isi.org/modern-age/conservatism-trump-and-beyond/
[https://perma.unl.edu/4RJ3-949S]. The Southern Agrarians, in particular, held
severely retrograde views on race and, albeit to a lesser extent, class. See PETER
KOLOZI, CONSERVATIVES AGAINST CAPITALISM: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
TO GLOBALIZATION 83 (2017) (discussing the Southern Agrarian project’s subordi-
nation of “poor whites and African Americans”).
26. See CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION 5 (2007) (“Our historical understand-
ing of what the Populists thought is largely drawn from what they protested.”).
27. In this Article, I adopt Margaret Blair’s definition of corporate governance as “the
whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determine what
publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is exer-
cised, and how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are allo-
cated.” MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3 (1996).
28. See JUDIS, supra note 17, at 14.
29. Accordingly, unless otherwise indicated, I use the term “populist” hereinafter to
refer to right-of-center populists.
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rate managers to act in ways those campaigners deem socially respon-
sible.30 Populists could use the same tactics to induce corporate
directors to make decisions they favor. If corporate boards gave way to
such campaigns, without a reasonable belief that the acts they take
are also in the best interests of the corporation’s shareholders, they
would violate the fiduciary duties discussed above.31 Having said that,
however, it must be acknowledged that the business judgment rule
gives directors wide discretion in this area.32 In addition, of course,
populists could seek to strengthen the nonshareholder constituency
statutes in effect in many states (albeit not including Delaware) or
even to create a federal version of such a statute, which would ex-
pressly authorize directors to pursue corporate purposes other than
shareholder wealth maximization.33 If populists chose to move in this
direction, there is plenty of legal room for them to do so. The question
thus is whether they are likely to do so based on their historical track
record.
Part IV asks whether modifying the shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion norms to give managers more discretion to take the social effects
of their decisions into account would lead to outcomes populists would
view as desirable. Populists historically have viewed corporate direc-
tors and managers as elites opposed to the best interests of the peo-
30. EVAN OSBORNE, THE RISE OF THE ANTI-CORPORATE MOVEMENT: CORPORATIONS
AND THE PEOPLE WHO HATE THEM 209 (2009).
31. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text (describing directors’ fiduciary
duties).
32. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(“When director decisions are reviewed under the business judgment rule, this
Court will not question rational judgments about how promoting non-stockholder
interests—be it through making a charitable contribution, paying employees
higher salaries and benefits, or more general norms like promoting a particular
corporate culture—ultimately promote stockholder value.”). While it is true that
the business judgment rule may sometimes have the practical effect of allowing a
board of directors to avoid liability to shareholders for making decisions moti-
vated by concerns other than shareholder wealth maximization, that is not the
rule’s purpose. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 601–05 (2003) (discussing
director discretion under the business judgment rule as it relates to the corporate
social responsibility debate). Indeed, a review of “the case law provides no sup-
port for [the] argument that the business judgment rule is intended to allow di-
rectors to mediate between competing interest groups.” Id. at 604.
33. See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and Cor-
porate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L.
393, 415 (1993) (“The United States Congress might, at some point, be tempted to
adopt a federal corporate chartering statute that includes mandatory non-
shareholder constituency provisions.”). For analyses of these statutes, see Joan
MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Stat-
utes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939,
948–50 (2017); Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Em-
ployee Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1230–36 (2004).
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ple.34 Today, populists find themselves increasingly at odds with an
emergent class of social justice warrior CEOs, whose views on a vari-
ety of critical issues are increasingly closer to those of blue-state elites
than those of red-state populists.35
At the outset, I should acknowledge that the value of my project as
an exercise in potential law reform depends on an assumption that the
present populist movement will persist for some time, despite the out-
come of the 2018 mid-term elections and the historical reality that
populist movements have often had brief lives.36 Even if the present
populist era proves to be fleeting, however, populism has long played
an important role in the regulation of corporate governance and thus
remains worthy of study.37 In addition, because corporate purpose is a
question of state corporate law, legal change in red states with strong
populist movements remains possible.
34. See, e.g., Robert D. Atkinson et al., How Tech Populism is Undermining Innova-
tion, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 2 (Apr. 2015), http://www2.itif.org/2015-
tech-populism.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/W9NE-VXYG] (“The populist view is
that elites, especially big business and big government, will prevent useful rules
from being established—or, if those rules are established, will find ways to by-
pass them at the expense of the broader public.”).
35. See generally JOEL KOTKIN, THE NEW CLASS CONFLICT 9–10 (2014) (discussing the
leftward shift among richest Americans, especially among elites in the financial
and tech sectors). Joel Kotkin divides the elite sector into two groups. At the very
top, in terms of wealth and income, are the Oligarchs of finance and technology.
See id. at 2–7 (describing the oligarch sector). Just below them are the group
Kotkin calls the Clerisy, which consists of those individuals at the top of the aca-
demic, media, government, and nonprofit sectors. See id. at 8 (describing and de-
fining the Clerisy). The Clerisy created and continues to propagate a political
worldview that Kotkin aptly named “gentry liberalism,” which has become the
prevailing political alignment among both the Clerisy and the Oligarchs. See id.
(describing gentry liberalism). At the bottom, the working non-elites constitute a
class for whom Kotkin revived the old moniker Yeoman. See id. at 12–13 (describ-
ing the state of the Yeomanry). Herein I will use the terms New Elites for the
former two classes and the Yeomanry for the latter. I borrow the term New Elites
from Christopher Lasch, who used it to describe “not only corporate managers,
but all those professions that produce and manipulate information.” CHRISTO-
PHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 5
(1995).
36. See, e.g., JUDIS, supra note 17, at 19 (explaining that although American populist
movements have tended to be short-lived, they are a recurrent phenomenon that
in their totality have had important impacts on American politics); KOLOZI, supra
note 25, at 103 (“Southern Agrarianism was never a popular political movement
and was only a short-lived intellectual movement.”).
37. See Christopher M. Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose in Post-Crisis Fi-
nancial Firms, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 527, 529 (2013) (“Populism has long ex-
erted substantial influence over U.S. corporate law—including prevailing
conceptions of corporate purpose—but has manifested itself in different ways in
financial and non-financial contexts, respectively.”).
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II. POPULISTS AND THE CORPORATION
Populism in the United States has a long history featuring multi-
ple peaks and troughs.38 Although the composition and goals of popu-
list movements have varied over time, certain recurring themes are
characteristic of most such movements.39 Importantly for our pur-
poses, one of the most common of these themes has been a deep suspi-
cion of corporate power.40 Our question is whether the populist
critique of American business has drilled down to the level of corpo-
rate purpose.
A. A Brief History of American Populism
The roots of American populism can be traced back to the Revolu-
tionary and Jacksonian periods, but the template of modern right-
wing populism was formed during the late nineteenth century.41 It
began with rural protest movements such as the Grange and the
Farmer’s Alliance.42 These groups represented a reaction to the rapid
economic changes American businessmen, workers, and farmers were
experiencing.43 “The traditional economic model of small, independent
businesses—central to the economic ideology of nineteenth-century
America—was rapidly ceding to a new reality of large, integrated cor-
porations, many of which had dominated their industries in the span
of only a few short years.”44 These new and vast business entities
38. Although its origins can be traced in large part to the United States, populism is
not a uniquely American phenomenon. See CAS MUDDE & CRISTO´BAL ROVIRA
KALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 21 (2017) (“Conventional
wisdom holds that populism emerged in the late 19th Century in Russia and the
United States . . . .”). Indeed, at least until the election of Donald Trump, populist
movements had achieved their greatest political successes outside the United
States, particularly in Latin America. See id. at 27 (“Latin America is the region
with the most enduring and prevalent populist tradition.”).
39. See id. at 9–19 (reviewing core Populist principles).
40. Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 321–22 (1998)
(“From Jeffersonian and Jacksonian social critics, to the Populists, and up to the
present, this strain of rhetoric attacks corporate power, using language originally
designed to attack the luxury and corruption of eighteenth century aristocrats.”
(footnotes omitted)).
41. See JUDIS, supra note 17, at 19 (describing origins of American populism). For an
overview of the development of populism in the postbellum period, which
culminated in the creation of the People’s Party, see ROBERT C. MCMATH, JR.,
AMERICAN POPULISM: A SOCIAL HISTORY, 1877–1898 (1992).
42. See MCMATH, supra note 41, at 50–82 (describing evolution of the Grange, the
Farmer’s Alliance, and related Agrarian protest movements).
43. Camden Hutchison, Progressive Era Conceptions of the Corporation and the Fail-
ure of the Federal Chartering Movement, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1017, 1032
(2017) (“At the end of the nineteenth century, Americans were keenly aware of
the economic changes occurring around them.”).
44. Id. at 1032–33.
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were perceived as posing a threat to the liberty and livelihood of the
American yeomanry.45
In the formative years, these groups tended to be short lived46 and
geographically dispersed.47 By the last decade of the nineteenth cen-
tury, however, the populist movement was simultaneously coalescing
and expanding to include other disaffected groups such as miners and
industrial laborers.48 In June 1892, the People’s Party held its first
national convention.49 It adopted a platform focused on a bimetallic
monetary policy and opposition to monopolies.50 Some have regarded
the platform as a “major salvo against the worldview of laissez-faire
capitalism.”51 In fact, however, the Populists did not favor displacing
capitalism with socialism, but rather they favored using government
regulation to reform capitalism to make it more humane and friend-
lier to the workers and farmers who comprised the bulk of the Populist
movement at that time.52
Although the Party managed to elect legislators in several states,
it was unable to achieve a coherent national movement or to
find a leader with national appeal.53 By the end of the 1890s, the
Party was moribund.54 In the early twentieth century, it thus was
45. See id. at 1035 (noting that “a common concern” among populists of that era “was
protecting the public from concentrated economic power”).
46. See MCMATH, supra note 41, at 71 (noting that the “life expectancy” of Southern
farm organizations in the 1880s “was short”).
47. Id. at 83 (“At the beginning of 1887 . . . the Agrarian movement in America con-
sisted of many separate islands of protest scattered across the South and West.”).
48. See id. at 116–18 (discussing the example of populist alliances in Colorado in the
1880s).
49. Id. at 166.
50. See id. at 167 (describing the Omaha platform of 1892).
51. JUDIS, supra note 17, at 21.
52. See, e.g., Ignatius Donnelly, Preamble to the Platform of the People’s Party (1892),
https://www.learner.org/workshops/primarysources/corporations/docs/popplat
.html [https://perma.unl.edu/4S25-N2JW] (“We believe that the powers of govern-
ment—in other words, of the people—should be expanded (as in the case of the
postal service) as rapidly and as far as the good sense of an intelligent people and
the teachings of experience shall justify, to the end that oppression, injustice, and
poverty shall eventually cease in the land.”).
53. See MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 38, at 21 (discussing regional successes of
the People’s Party). In 1896, an unraveling Party decided to support Democratic
presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan, but Bryan declined even to ac-
knowledge his nomination by the Populists. MCMATH, supra note 41, at 204.
54. MCMATH, supra note 41, at 206 (describing the Party’s descent into irrelevance);
ROE, supra note 17, at 285 (noting that “[a]nti-finance ‘populism’ [wa]s not what
it once was as a political force”). In addition, many former People’s Party mem-
bers began moving away from an approach focused on reforming capitalism and
towards a sort of rural socialism, complaining that “the capitalist masters . . .
own the full machinery of our government from the justice of the peace up.” Jarod
Roll, Agrarian Producerism after Populism: Socialism and Garveyism in the Ru-
ral South, in POPULISM IN THE SOUTH REVISITED: NEW INTERPRETATIONS AND NEW
DEPARTURES 199, 207 (James M. Beeby ed., 2017).
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the Progressive movement that took the lead in reforming busi-
ness.55
In the 1930s, however, a group of intellectuals centered around
Vanderbilt University gave rise to a new populist movement known as
Southern Agrarianism.56 The Agrarians were harsh critics of monop-
oly capitalism.57 At the same time, however, they were also strongly
opposed to socialism, which they believed led to revolution and
dictatorship.58
The Agrarians’ hostility to large corporations followed directly
from that dialectic because they believed that the relationship be-
tween large corporations and a powerful government would evolve
from crony capitalism to fascism or communism. Lyle Lanier, for ex-
ample, wrote that giant corporations had “become the instruments of
an economic fascism.”59 Frank Owsley likewise complained that a rel-
atively few wealthy individuals were able “to control most of the na-
tion’s wealth and to regiment virtually the whole population under
their anonymous holding companies and corporations.”60 Yet, their
concern was directed more at monopolistic abuses than the corporate
form itself.61 Accordingly, their primary political agenda envisioned
recreating an economy comprised mainly of small communities of yeo-
55. See Ann L. Schiavone, Real Bite: Legal Realism and Meaningful Rational Basis
in Dog Law and Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS J. 65, 82 (2016) (“The
progressives of the early twentieth century relied heavily on the evolving concept
of police power in the United States, resulting in passage of laws regulating busi-
ness and the economic systems based on the goals of protecting health, safety,
and morals.”).
56. See Emily S. Bingham & Thomas A. Underwood, Introduction, in THE SOUTHERN
AGRARIANS AND THE NEW DEAL: ESSAYS AFTER I’LL TAKE MY STAND 1, 2 (Emily S.
Bingham & Thomas A. Underwood eds., 2001) (describing the Southern Agrari-
ans as “a group of Southern conservatives who . . . emerged from Nashville’s Van-
derbilt University”).
57. Id. at 16–17 (noting that Southern Agrarians were “unremitting critic[s] of mo-
nopoly capitalism”).
58. See id. at 17 (explaining that the Agrarians “abhorred the prospect of mass politi-
cal movement and the notion of class-based struggle that infused socialist
thought”).
59. Lyle Lanier, Big Business in the Property State, in WHO OWNS AMERICA? A NEW
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 18, 18 (Herbert Agar & Allen Tate eds., 1936).
See generally Hutchison, supra note 43, at 1052 (noting that populists “feared any
concentration of economic power, even (and perhaps especially) if controlled by
the federal government”).
60. Frank Lawrence Owsley, The Pillars of Agrarianism, in THE SOUTHERN AGRARI-
ANS AND THE NEW DEAL: ESSAYS AFTER I’LL TAKE MY STAND, supra note 56, at
199, 202.
61. See id. at 202 (stating that the Southern Agrarians agreed “that the most desira-
ble objective is to break them [i.e., giant corporations] down into small units
owned and controlled by real people”).
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man farmers and artisans.62 As such, it was less a program than a
utopian dream that was inherently unrealistic.63 In any case, the
movement’s association with fascism, anti-Semitism, and racism led
to it being discredited, and it had sputtered out by the end of the
1930s.64
Some commentators identify various postwar right-wing move-
ments—such as McCarthyism, the George Wallace presidential cam-
paign in 1968, and the Ross Perot presidential campaigns of the
1990s—as populist in nature.65 But the most recent outbreak of popu-
list anti-capitalism is properly traced to Pat Buchanan’s 1996 cam-
paign for the Republican presidential nomination, a campaign marked
by hostility to globalization, in general, and transnational corpora-
tions, in particular.66 Buchanan’s campaign solidified a view among
the emergent populist movement that large corporations and crony
capitalism were diluting America’s exceptional culture and identity
through globalization and impoverishing working-class Americans
while enriching financial and technology oligarchs.67
The Tea Party and the 2016 Trump campaign are of greater import
for our purposes. They espoused “an aversion to Wall Street,” opposi-
tion to government bailouts of financial firms, and a “strong producer-
ist message.”68 They share many attributes with the other major
twenty-first century American populist movement—Occupy Wall
Street—including an antagonism towards corporate power.69
62. See James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the
Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument,
76 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1243 (1998) (“The Southern Agrarians, of course, placed the
Agrarian life at the heart of Southernism . . . .”); see also Steven J. Eagle, The
Really New Property: A Skeptical Appraisal, 43 IND. L. REV. 1229, 1275 n.342
(2010) (“Southern Agrarians especially stressed individual property ownership as
necessary to a culture of family self-reliance.”).
63. See WILLIAM P. HUSTWIT, JAMES J. KILPATRICK: SALESMAN FOR SEGREGATION 183
(2013) (noting “the impracticability of the Vanderbilt Agrarians’ economic posi-
tions in an industrialized America” and “the mythic aspects of their vision”).
64. See KOLOZI, supra note 25, at 103 (discussing reasons Southern Agrarianism
proved “a short-lived intellectual movement”).
65. See JUDIS, supra note 17, at 28–53 (discussing populist movements following the
demise of the People’s Party); MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 38, at 24–25
(discussing postwar populist movements).
66. See JUDIS, supra note 17, at 51–52 (discussing Buchanan campaign).
67. See OSBORNE, supra note 30, at 9 (discussing the impact of the Buchanan cam-
paign on the development of populist thinking).
68. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 38, at 26–27. Producerism is a thesis widely
shared by populists arguing “that only those who created wealth in tangible, ma-
terial ways (on and under the land, in workshops, on the sea) could be trusted to
guard the nation’s piety and liberties.” MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUA-
SION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 13 (1995).
69. See David G. Yosifon, The Social Relations of Consumption: Corporate Law and
the Meaning of Consumer Culture, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1309, 1339 (2015) (noting
that “corporate antagonists ranging from the Tea Party members to activists in
556 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:543
There were signs of a remerging populist suspicion of big business
and the corporation even before the financial crisis of 2007. A 2004
University of Chicago poll, for example, found that seven out of eleven
nonbusiness social institutions were more respected than “major busi-
nesses.”70 A 2005 Harris Poll found that “big business” was the social
institution that the largest number of respondents identified as hav-
ing too much political power.71 Big business, moreover, was one of
only two social institutions for whom the percentage of respondents
identifying it as having too much power had risen since 1994.72
It was the financial crisis, however, that gave rise to modern popu-
lism. Specifically, the Tea Party emerged largely in reaction to the fed-
eral government bailouts of the financial and automobile industries,73
which were perceived as favoring Wall Street over Main Street,74 al-
though concerns about globalization and wealth inequalities were also
contributing factors.75 Unlike traditional pro-business Republicans,
the Tea Party wing of the GOP opposed what they called corporate
welfare.76
the Occupy movement [ ] speak in desperate terms about the role of corporations
in our society”). But while Tea Party leaders sharply criticized establishment
Republicans for being too close to big banks, the Tea Party is neither anti-capital-
ist nor pro-socialist. See JUDIS, supra note 17, at 57–58 (discussing the origins
and goals of the Tea Party). Tea Party members are typically staunch defenders
of the free market system, which they believe has been corrupted by crony capi-
talism that benefits large businesses as the expense of the people. See MUDDE &
KALTWASSER, supra note 38, at 13.
70. See OSBORNE, supra note 30, at 197.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See Robert Quigley, The Impulse Towards Individual Criminal Punishment After
the Financial Crisis, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 103, 128 n.149 (2015) (arguing the
Tea Party movement emerged in a wave of populist outrage over the 2008 bank
bailouts).
74. See Michael A. Livingston, Robespierre Meets the Foreign Tax Credit: Reflections
on Piketty’s “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” and the Contemporary Tax
Policy Debate, 40 ACTEC L.J. 181, 182 (2014) (book review) (“Even the Tea Party,
while conservative on social issues, has adopted an anti-elitist tone, complaining
of corporate bailouts and demanding more attention to the average voter.”).
75. See OSBORNE, supra note 30, at 197 (discussing the impact of these factors on
rising populist sentiment); Julia Azari & Marc J. Hetherington, Back to the Fu-
ture? What the Politics of the Late Nineteenth Century Can Tell Us About the 2016
Election, 667 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 92, 101–02 (2016) (noting that
“economic inequality has become a central theme of twenty-first-century polit-
ics . . . with these questions animating themes in the 2016 election on both the
Left and Right” (citation omitted)).
76. See Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right That
Big Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639,
660–61 (2011) (observing that the Tea Party “tends to be opposed to both parties
and to large corporations that seek their favor”); Ilya Shapiro & Carl G. DeNigris,
Occupy Pennsylvania Avenue: How the Government’s Unconstitutional Actions
Hurt the 99%, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1085, 1097 (2012) (“The understandable outrage
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Thus, the failures of corporate governance gave rise, at least indi-
rectly, to the Tea Party rebellion. A substantial body of post-crisis re-
search suggests that equity-based performance pay practices and,
more generally, the greater emphasis on shareholders’ interests evi-
dent in the 2000s resulted in greater risk-taking by financial firms.77
In the wake of the 2012 presidential election, it was often sug-
gested that the Republican party would need to accommodate this
emergent movement by shifting in a more populist direction.78 This
prediction came true during the 2016 Republican presidential nomina-
tion campaign as the populist trend manifested itself in Donald
Trump’s successful run for the nomination. Trump’s core supporters
were not part of the usual Republican coalition of free market libertar-
ians and social issue conservatives. Instead, they more closely resem-
bled classic economic populists.79 As a result, Trump’s election
confirmed that a more populist stance was a winning formula.80 This
resulted in the emergence of a substantial power bloc within the Re-
publican Party that directs its anger not only at traditional GOP ene-
mies, like big government, but also towards financial and corporate
executives.81 As The Economist’s Schumpeter columnist observed, it is
this combination of political power and anti-business animus that
raises the question of corporate purpose.82
[provoked by corporate bailouts during the Obama administration], voiced
through the Tea Party and Occupy movements, has called into question not just
the policy rationales behind such corporate welfare, but the legal authority sup-
porting it.”); R. Ryan Staine, Crez II, Coming Soon to a Windy Texas Plain Near
You?: Encouraging the Texas Renewable Energy Industry Through Transmission
Investment, 93 TEX. L. REV. 521, 547 (2014) (“The Tea Party and libertarian
movements have emerged as powerful forces in the Republican Party, and those
groups have expressed opposition to anything that could be seen as ‘corporate
welfare.’”).
77. See Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36
J. CORP. L. 309, 317 (2011) (reviewing the evidence in question).
78. See Daniel A. Farber, The Conservative as Environmentalist: From Goldwater
and the Early Reagan to the 21st Century, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 1005, 1042 (2017)
(“After the 2012 election, a prescient voting analyst argued that the GOP would
need to abandon ‘some of its more pro-corporate stances’ and become more
‘America first’ on trade and immigration, and more populist on economic issues.”
(quoting E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY THE RIGHT WENT WRONG: CONSERVATISM—FROM
GOLDWATER TO THE TEA PARTY AND BEYOND 383 (2016))).
79. See JUDIS, supra note 17, at 77.
80. See Farber, supra note 78, at 1042 (noting that populist economic “positions be-
came the centerpieces of Donald Trump’s victorious campaign for the Republican
nomination”).
81. See Steven McNamara, Financial Markets Uncertainty and the Rawlsian Argu-
ment for Central Counterparty Clearing of OTC Derivatives, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 277 (2014).
82. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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B. Populists Versus the Corporation
As suggested by the history reviewed in the preceding section, pop-
ulist critiques of the corporation generally target abuses of the form
rather than the corporate form itself. Some populists were simply
doubtful of the corporation’s fitness for purpose, disputing its utility
as a way of organizing production.83 More often, however, right-wing
populists objected to the separation of ownership and control inherent
in the corporate form, arguing that it separated ownership from re-
sponsibility.84 This concern was not driven by populist sympathy for
investors, as most modern scholars contend, but rather with the lack
of social accountability inherent in dispersed and distant ownership.85
The Agrarians believed modern corporate capitalism had created a
new class of absentee owners that had broken down older systems in
which owners and laborers had recognized their mutual obligations.86
The Agrarians thus echoed Berle’s contemporaneous complaint that
the ownership structure of modern corporations divorced ownership
and control,87 but added the complaint that the public corporate form
divorced a business’ owners from the firm’s workers and the local com-
munities within which the firm did business.88
83. See, e.g., Richard B. Ransom, Corporate and Private Persons, in WHO OWNS
AMERICA? A NEW DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 59, at 68, 70 (“The
total usefulness of corporate forms seems to me to be overrated, and much of the
efficiency of the large corporation is either illusory or highly questionable.”).
84. See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE SOUTHERN TRADITION: THE ACHIEVEMENT AND
LIMITATIONS OF AN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM 80–81 (1994) (discussing the Agra-
rian critique of the corporation); see, e.g., Anderson Nelson Lytle, The Hind Tit, in
I’LL TAKE MY STAND: THE SOUTH AND THE AGRARIAN TRADITION 201, 243 (La.
State Univ. Press, reprt. 2006) (“Mortgage companies, insurance companies,
banks, and bonding-houses that are forced to take over the land of free men . . .
what will be the social relationship? What can an abstract corporation like an
insurance company . . . know of a farmer’s life?” (first alteration in original)).
85. See Hutchison, supra note 43, at 1035 (“Rather than viewing the corporate form
as an enabling mechanism for private enterprise—the mainstream academic
view of corporations today—many at the time continued to view corporations as
quasi-public instruments of the state, whose legal privileges were predicated
upon provision of a public benefit.”).
86. See KOLOZI, supra note 25, at 87.
87. See Kenneth Lipartito & Yumiko Morii, Rethinking the Separation of Ownership
from Management in American History, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1025, 1059 n.44
(2010) (noting that contemporaneous reviewers of Berle and Means’s work con-
cluded it “had demonstrated the dangers resulting from the divorce of ownership
from control”).
88. See KOLOZI, supra note 25, at 87. Put another way, the Southern Agrarians be-
lieved that the development of the modern public corporation, with its separation
of ownership and control, transformed economic activity from personal to imper-
sonal exchanges. Id. at 89–90.
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The Agrarian ideal was small farms and businesses owned by
those in the local community.89 Whether it was ever practicable to re-
store such a bucolic utopia—assuming one ever existed—in a modern
industrial economy is highly doubtful.90 But even if it were, what the
Agrarians—among others—failed to understand is that the separa-
tion of ownership and control in the corporation is a feature and not a
bug.91 Only the very smallest and most highly localized businesses
could exist without separating ownership from control.92
In time, however, most populists came to recognize that the prob-
lem was not the corporate form as such because they recognized that
even locally owned and operated business could advantageously use
the corporate form.93 The problem thus was not the form itself
89. See, e.g., Allen Tate, Notes on Liberty and Property, in WHO OWNS AMERICA? A
NEW DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 59, at 80, 92–93 (discussing
Agrarians’ desire to reunite ownership and control); Herbert Agar, ‘But Can it be
Done?’, in WHO OWNS AMERICA? A NEW DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra
note 59 at 94, 104–05 (advocating a system of “[d]ecentralized factories producing
for local use . . . owned by the people directly concerned with them”).
90. Cf. YOSIFON, supra note 11, at 204–05 (“Nobody wants to return to the ‘penurious
self-sufficiency of the household system,’ much less the dreary, limited cultural
life it contained. The depravities of abundance are preferable to the banality of
deprivation.” (footnote omitted) (quoting D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF IN-
DUSTRY 104 (1923))).
91. See, e.g., Howard M. Friedman, The Silent LLC Revolution—The Social Cost of
Academic Neglect, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 43 (2004) (“Corporate law developed
both mandatory and default rules designed to protect geographically dispersed
passive investors from the shirking, self-dealing and incompetence of those man-
aging the pooled funds originally invested by shareholders.”); Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J.
1593, 1682 (1988) (citing A. CHANDLER JR., THE VISIBLE HAND 9–10 (1977)) (“The
separation of ownership and control was essential to the modern business corpo-
ration’s ability to command its resources efficiently.”). See generally Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV.
601, 628 (2006) (arguing that “the separation of ownership and control mandated
by U.S. corporate law has . . . a strong efficiency justification”).
92. See Thomas A. Smith, The Passion of Professor Fischel: Defending Milken’s Fi-
nancial Revolution, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1041, 1042 (1997) (“Ownership and
control have always been separated in businesses of any size, and this separation
is no worse now than it was when Berle and Means wrote [in 1932].”).
93. See, e.g., John Batt, American Legal Populism: A Jurisprudential and Historical
Narrative, Including Reflections on Critical Legal Studies, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 651,
702 (1995) (explaining that, in the 1830s, “newly elected Jacksonians followed the
lead of their legal populist president and passed incorporation statutes that al-
lowed small business people the advantages of the corporate form of doing busi-
ness”). In an important analysis, Stephen Presser contends that the expansion of
the availability of the corporate form in the mid-nineteenth century was an out-
growth of populist democratic theory. Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing
of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L.
REV. 148, 155–56 (1992). The nineteenth century legislators who first adopted
limited liability as a central feature of corporate law did so, Presser contends, to
encourage small and impecunious entrepreneurs to start and grow new busi-
nesses. Without the shield of limited liability, only very wealthy persons would
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but rather the massive power wielded by the very largest corpora-
tions.94
Size and the resulting potential for concentrated economic power
are thus the chief recurring themes in the populist critique of the cor-
poration. Late nineteenth century populists thought that the growing
power of corporations was a significant threat to their economic and
political liberty.95 The Southern Agrarians likewise believed, as Lyle
Lanier observed, that “the corporate form of our economic system
makes possible a scale of exploitation unheard of in history.”96 In par-
ticular, the Agrarians saw large corporations as leviathans trampling
on their employees. The labor corporations provided lacked security.
Workers toiled under dehumanizing conditions. Yet, the law protected
it by enshrining the rights of corporations into the Constitution.97 The
Southern Agrarians further believed that the concentration of eco-
nomic power in large corporations had created “a plutocratic corporate
capitalist class” that effectively ruled the country and thus stood
ready to fully exploit their power over farmers and workers.98
Much the same set of concerns motivates many Tea Party mem-
bers. In response to the Citizens United decision,99 for example, Tea
Party co-founder Dale Robertson complained that “[c]orporations are
not like people. Corporations exist forever, people don’t. Our founding
fathers never wanted them; these behemoth organizations that never
incorporate their businesses. It seems probable that such considerations, coupled
with a closely related desire to promote capital formation and economic growth,
drove (and still drive) the political support for limited liability. See id. at 163.
94. See Martha T. McCluskey, The Substantive Politics of Formal Corporate Power,
53 BUFF. L. REV. 1453, 1479 (2006) (arguing that “the populist effort to control big
business by popularizing the corporate form ended up facilitating the rise of cor-
porate robber barons”).
95. See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1,
43 (1999) (explaining that “farmers and working people” believed their rights “as
citizens were in jeopardy because of corporate power”); Hutchison, supra note 43,
at 1035 (noting that “a common concern” among late nineteenth century popu-
lists “was protecting the public from concentrated economic power”).
96. Lyle H. Lanier, A Critique of the Philosophy of Progress, in I’LL TAKE MY STAND:
THE SOUTH AND THE AGRARIAN TRADITION, supra note 84, at 122, 141. Southern
Agrarian Frank Lawrence Owsley likewise argued that the people’s common en-
emy was “a system which allows a relatively few men to control most of the na-
tion’s wealth and to regiment virtually the whole population under their
anonymous holding companies and corporations, and to control government by
bribery or intimidation.” Owsley, supra note 60, at 202.
97. See, e.g., Henry Clay Evans, Jr., Liberty Under the Old Deal, in WHO OWNS
AMERICA? A NEW DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 59, at 295 (discuss-
ing conditions of work in large corporations during the Depression).
98. KOLOZI, supra note 25, at 93; see also Forbath, supra note 95, at 43 (explaining
that populists believed “corporate power had combined with an overweening judi-
ciary and corrupt party system to shatter the sovereign people’s control of the
state and federal governments that were meant to carry out their will”).
99. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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die. . . . It puts the people at a tremendous disadvantage.”100 Tea
Party activists also tend to be uncomfortable with business’s political
agenda and business’s lack of support for Tea Party social issues.101
The inability or unwillingness of large corporations to assist in ad-
dressing “the political alienation and economic instability” felt by
many gave rise to “both left- and right-wing populism” and helped
elect Donald Trump.102
C. Populist Regulatory Proposals
In response to their various concerns about corporations, populists
have long believed that corporations “should be controlled ‘as we con-
trol steam and electricity, which are also dangerous if not carefully
managed, but of wonderful usefulness if rightly harnessed to the car of
progress.’”103 Although state corporate law is the font of our corporate
governance system,104 populists have long believed that state law is
too lax in regulating large corporations.105 In the 1920s, for example,
100. Greg Coleridge, The System Isn’t Broken, It’s Fixed: Ending Big Money and Cor-
porations in Our Elections, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 541, 557 (2013) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting The SCOTUS ‘Corporate Cash for Candidates’ Decision: Left, Right
and Tea, REID REPORT (Jan. 21, 2010), http://blog.reidreport.com/2010/01/supco-
campaign-cash-decisionreactions/ (blog no longer active)).
101. See Ann Southworth, Elements of the Support Structure for Campaign Finance
Litigation in the Roberts Court, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 319, 347 (2018) (“Advo-
cates for business interests, such as the Chamber of Commerce, tend to be un-
comfortable with the issue agendas of some of the social conservative and Tea-
Party-affiliated groups, and vice versa.”).
102. Richard C. Schragger, The Political Economy of City Power, 44 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 91, 95 (2017). In a New York Times op-ed, Sarah Smarsh explained that her
white, working class father is angry not at minorities but “at bosses who exploit
labor and governments that punish the working poor—two sides of a capitalist
democracy that bleeds people like him dry. ‘Corporations,’ Dad said. ‘That’s it.
That’s the point of the sword that’s killing us.’” Sarah Smarsh, Liberal Blind
Spots Are Hiding the Truth About ‘Trump Country’, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/opinion/trump-corporations-white-working-
class.html [https://perma.unl.edu/8A56-6MNL].
103. Hutchison, supra note 43, at 1040 (quoting William Wirt Howe, New Orleans Bd.
of Trade, Address to Chicago Conference on Trusts (Sept. 16, 1899), in CHICAGO
CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS: SPEECHES, DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, LIST OF DELEGATES,
COMMITTEES, ETC. 383 (Civic Fed’n of Chi. ed., 1900)).
104. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (“ ‘Corporations are creatures
of state law,’ and it is state law which is the font of corporate directors’ powers.”
(citation omitted) (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479
(1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975))).
105. See Hutchison, supra note 43, at 1035 (“Given the liberalization of state corporate
law and the rapid growth of national combinations, many [populist attendees at
an 1899 conference] feared that individual state governments had abandoned
their responsibility to the public interest.”); id. at 1071 (explaining that, “at the
conference, Judge Peter Grosscup of the Seventh Circuit . . . claimed that several
state governments allowed the formation of corporations without any oversight
whatsoever”).
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the state laws that allowed dual class stock, which “permitted inves-
tors with a relatively small financial investment to control the voting
shares of the company[,] aroused populist ire . . . and led to a stock
exchange ban.”106 The same sort of populist dissatisfaction with state
law also led to the adoption of the federal securities laws in the
1930s.107
Instead, as the latter example suggests, populists typically have
looked to federal law to regulate large corporations. As one might ex-
pect, given their concern with size and concentrated economic power,
populist regulatory proposals typically focus on “limiting the size and
scope of corporations themselves.”108 Herbert Agar, for example, ar-
gued that society could achieve the Southern Agrarian program of
decentralizing business through “two forms of [government] interven-
tion: differential taxation, and control of new capital issues.”109 In ad-
dition to other measures, such as antitrust limits on the size of
corporations and increased corporate taxes, the Agrarians favored
public ownership of utilities and eliminating the corporation’s status
as a corporate person.110
Richard Ransom offered the most detailed regulatory proposal of
the Southern Agrarian era. Ransom proposed federal rather than
state incorporation “of all corporations subject to federal regula-
tion,”111 which obviously cuts a rather broad swath. He further pro-
posed a graduated scale of federal supervision ranging from oversight
of corporate charters and debt issuances by corporations engaged in
interstate commerce to “complete Federal administration or owner-
106. Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Federalism in the Administrative State: The
SEC’s Discretion to Move the Line Between the State and Federal Realms of Cor-
porate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1143, 1158 (2007) (footnote omitted).
Interestingly, dual class stock capital structures have seen a resurgence, espe-
cially among the oligarchs of Silicon Valley. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kas-
tiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 591
(2017) (noting that, “since Google decided to use a dual-class structure for its
2004 IPO, a significant number of ‘hot’ tech companies have followed its lead”).
107. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 42
(1982) (“Roosevelt committed himself to the long-held populist and progressive
goal of superseding lax state corporation laws with more stringent federal
standards.”).
108. Hutchison, supra note 43, at 1085–86.
109. Agar, supra note 89, at 105.
110. See KOLOZI, supra note 25, at 97 (summarizing the Southern Agrarians’ political
platform with respect to regulation of big business). Some modern populists in
the Tea Party likewise favor eliminating the corporation’s status as a constitu-
tional person. See Jedediah Purdy, That We Are Underlings: The Real Problems
in Disciplining Political Spending and the First Amendment, 30 CONST. COMMENT
391, 395 (2015) (arguing that the Tea Party “may like stripping corporate per-
sonhood of constitutional significance”).
111. Ransom, supra note 83, at 76.
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ship” of corporations so affected with a public interest that “their na-
tional ownership is highly probable.”112 Third, he endorsed a regime
of personal liability for shareholders under which they could be held
liable for “an amount at least equal to twice” their investment. He be-
lieved this would promote “greater personal responsibility of the
shareholders for the conduct of the business,”113 an idea that presum-
ably came as a response to the populist complaint about the separa-
tion of ownership and control. In addition, Ransom supported the
usual populist proposals for more rigorous antitrust enforcement and
“heavy selective inheritance taxation on the transfer of corporate
shares or assets.”114
III. THE POPULISTS’ REGULATORY AGENDA
Perhaps because of the skepticism about the effectiveness of state
regulation or their lack of concern with the interests of investors as
opposed to those of farmers and laborers, the Southern Agrarians de-
voted little attention to corporate governance. Other generations of
populists, however, did devote some attention to governance issues.115
Populist politics came into play during the 1955 bank holding com-
pany hearings, the mid-1960s Patman report on banks, the SEC’s
1960s crackdown on mutual fund control of portfolio companies, and
the 1980s antitakeover legislative efforts at both the federal and state
levels.116
A. Populists and Corporate Purpose
When one turns to the specific issue of corporate purpose, however,
there is relatively little discussion in the populist literature. One im-
portant exception was the early twentieth century work of Thorstein
Veblen, who argued that the corporate separation of ownership and
control allowed managers discretion to pursue socially responsible ac-
tivities at the expense of profit maximization.117 In addition, a num-
ber of Southern Agrarians criticized corporate directors and managers
112. Id.
113. Id. at 77.
114. Id. at 75.
115. See ROE, supra note 17, at 29 (explaining that although populism’s influence on
the development of antitrust law is well known, populism also had less widely
acknowledged impact on corporate governance, albeit primarily indirectly
through regulation of financial institutions).
116. See id. at 32 (discussing role of populist rhetoric in those events).
117. See RENGINEE PILLAY, THE CHANGING NATURE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY 70–71 (2015) (discussing Veblen). Although some question whether Veblen
should be classed as a populist, his work is fairly regarded as being influenced by
populist ideas. See Jan Toporowski, Old Populism and the New Ideas of Michal
Kalecki, AM. AFFAIRS, Summer 2018, at 35, 39 (assessing that a “lasting intellec-
tual legacy of the populists is found in the work of Thorstein Veblen”).
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for failing to be socially responsible, especially with respect to the
rights of workers.118 In particular, Lyle Lanier endorsed the view that
corporate managers should “be induced to operate them with greater
regard for the public welfare.”119
Beyond these few examples, however, populist literature is largely
bare of discussion of corporate purpose. Indeed, other than some scat-
tered Tea Party opposition to the corporation’s constitutional status as
a legal person,120 today’s populists have shown little interest in the
sort of legal reforms advocated by their predecessors. Unlike left-of-
center populists and progressives, neither Tea Party nor Donald
Trump’s supporters have shown interest in encouraging voluntary
corporate social responsibility.121
This is somewhat surprising. Neither the Tea Party nor the Trump
administration are as committed to big business as were Republican
voters and politicians in the past.122 They also have good reason to
118. See, e.g., John Crowe Ransom, What Does the South Want?, in WHO OWNS
AMERICA? A NEW DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 59, at 178, 184
(“Under Big Business and limited liability the spirit of noblesse oblige has disap-
peared from the working habits of the rulers of society.”); Tate, supra note 89, at
85 (observing that the corporation consisted of “a system of property rights in
which responsibility to labor is on principle irrelevant”).
119. Lanier, supra note 59, at 27.
120. See supra note 100 (discussing Tea Party objections to corporate personhood).
121. David Yosifon pointed out that “the whole Carrier episode, the continuing NFL
episode, the constant tweeting about specific firms, is all about encouraging ‘vol-
untary’ corporate social responsibility. There is an implicit threat of regulation
(or worse) if firms do not comply.” E-mail from David Yosifon to author (Aug. 14,
2018, 10:48 PDT) (on file with author).
Steve Bradford likewise commented that:
Doing what Trump (or any other populist) wants could be perfectly con-
sistent with profit maximization. In fact, where I think Trump and per-
haps Warren differ from some of the traditional populists is in their
attempt to make their goals the profit-maximizing choice. There’s an im-
plicit threat that, if you don’t do what we want, we will impose higher
taxes, take away your government contracts, etc. In Trump’s case, that
threat is sometimes even explicit. When an American manufacturer
changes its mind and chooses not to move outside the United States, it’s
at least arguable that changing its mind was the profit-maximizing solu-
tion. The corporation is not doing it to save American jobs, but to avoid
the negative consequences threatened by Trump.
E-mail from Steve Bradford to author (July 25, 2018, 12:31 PDT) (on file with
author).
I take their points, but I nevertheless see little, if any, evidence of a sustained
and organized effort to promote voluntary corporate social responsibility on the
part of right-of-center populists.
122. See, e.g., Marcia Narine Weldon, Corporate Governance, Compliance, Social Re-
sponsibility, and Enterprise Risk Management in the Trump/Pence Era, 19
TRANSACTIONS 275, 276–77 (2017) (observing that President Trump “has, in some
instances, issued executive orders and proposed legislation that completely con-
travenes much of what his former business peers have advocated for over the
years” (footnote omitted)).
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demand a higher degree of social responsibility on the part of busi-
ness, especially with respect to workers. As we have seen, since the
Buchanan campaigns in the 1990s, populists believe that large corpo-
rations and crony capitalism are undermining America’s exceptional-
ism and America’s national identity through globalization, while
simultaneously impoverishing the working class and enriching the fi-
nancial and technology oligarchs.123 As we have also seen, this con-
cern reached a peak in response to the post-financial crisis bailouts.124
At a deeper level, the globalization of big business and related eco-
nomic trends have left many modern populists behind. The top third of
Americans, who are skilled, college-educated workers and managers
in successfully globalized industries such as finance, technology, and
electronics, have done well.125 The bottom two-thirds are low-skilled
workers whose jobs have been lost or threatened by globalization and
technology.126 Foreign trade, foreign direct investment, immigration,
and declining union participation have also played a role in their de-
clining fortunes.127 Neither the government nor big business have
seemed able or even very interested in addressing their concerns,
which contributed importantly to the rise of the Tea Party and the
success of the Trump campaign.128
It is then surprising that modern populists confronted with cases
like the Carrier fight discussed at the outset have not insisted on cor-
porate directors and managers behaving in ways populists regard as
socially responsible. As we have seen, current law mandates that di-
rectors adopt shareholder wealth maximization as their exclusive
maximand, but the business judgment rule’s insulative effect gives di-
rectors substantial discretion to pursue other interests in most
cases.129 As such, while UTC’s board faced minimal risk of individual
liability if they had considered issues like patriotism and solidarity
with American workers when making the Carrier decision, they
would—at least technically—be skirting, if not violating, the law. To
123. See OSBORNE, supra note 30, at 9.
124. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
125. See Thomas Ferguson et al., Industrial Structure and Party Competition in an
Age of Hunger Games: Donald Trump and the 2016 Presidential Election 25–26
(Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 66, 2018) (discussing Peter
Temin’s analysis of the polarization of income and wealth in the contemporary
United States).
126. Id.
127. See id. at 27 (discussing factors pushing workers into the bottom sector).
128. Schragger, supra note 102, at 95 (“Neither the nation-state nor the transnational
corporation seem able to address the political alienation and economic instability
felt by many citizens in the U.S. and elsewhere. This felt instability has given
rise to both left-and right-wing populism, often tainted by xenophobia and nation-
alism. In the United States, Donald Trump’s presidential victory is illustrative of
the latter.”).
129. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text (discussing current law).
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encourage directors to take such factors into consideration, populists
might seek to change current law to expressly authorizes directors to
do so. Indeed, one might even expect them to follow the lead of their
left-of-center populist and progressive counterparts and insist that the
law mandate such behavior. To date, however, no such effort has been
forthcoming.130
The problem may simply be one of getting the issue on their radar
screen. As Randy Barnett has observed of the Tea Party’s constitu-
tional agenda:
Genuine mass movements do not develop innovative or concrete policies. In-
stead, they demand that those in the political and intellectual classes produce
ideas that the movement will then vet. In other words, the Tea Party is not
the producer of ideas for social change, nor should that be expected. Rather, it
is an emerging political market for such ideas. When it comes to the Constitu-
tion, I no more expect Tea Partiers to produce detailed critiques of current
constitutional practice or develop a reform agenda than I expect the readers of
these Remarks collectively to design the iPods, iPhones or iPads they love, the
cars they drive, or the clothes they wear. Just as consumers are the ultimate
judges of whether they like or are indifferent to any particular device, so too
will Tea Partiers be the judges of which reform ideas appeal to them and
which leave them cold and unsatisfied.131
The same may be true of corporate governance reform.
B. Prospects for Legal Change
Let us assume that populists turn their attention to corporate pur-
pose. As we have seen, current law does not contemplate corporate
executives putting the interests of domestic U.S. stakeholders ahead
of those of shareholders. What prospects are there for a Tea Party-
driven change in that law?
In the first instance, corporate purpose is mostly judge made
law132 and the courts that matter most—the Delaware Supreme and
130. Some observers likely will explain the lack of attention to corporate purpose by
modern populists by arguing that the Tea Party and the Trump campaign are
“astroturf” political campaigns covertly advancing the interests of big business.
See Ryan D. Murphy, Tea Party Constitutionalism: Does the “Astroturf” Have
Roots in the History of the Constitution?, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187, 188
(2012) (noting that some critics view “the organic nature of the Tea Party move-
ment as a myth” and claim that when one looks closer “you will see that the
grassroots are actually ‘astroturf’”). There may be some truth to that argument,
but, in fact, “the Tea Party is not astroturf directed by Kansas billionaires, . . . it
is not a product of Fox News, . . . it is not an adjunct of the Republican Party,” but
rather “is a genuinely grassroots movement of millions of people.” Randy Barnett,
The Tea Party, the Constitution, and the Repeal Amendment, 105 NW. U.L. REV.
COLLOQUY 281, 282 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
131. Barnett, supra note 130, at 282.
132. As Rene´ Reich-Graefe observed, “[O]ver thirty states have adopted so-called non-
shareholder constituency statutes as part of their respective state corporate stat-
utes, thereby amending the existing statutory fiduciary duty framework for
corporate directors.” Rene´ Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate Governance:
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Chancery courts—are firmly wedded to shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion.133 To be sure, some scholars believe judges are more likely to be
receptive to anti-business arguments than legislators and regula-
tors.134 The Delaware courts, however, seem an unlikely vehicle
for a right-wing populist revolt against shareholder wealth
maximization.135
Absolute Director Primacy, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 341, 377 (2011).
Neither Delaware nor the Model Business Corporation Act has incorporated such
a statute, however. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Max-
imization as a Function of Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 949 (2017) (noting the absence of such provisions in
those statutes). Only one state ever adopted a statute mandating that directors
consider interests other than those of shareholders when making corporate deci-
sions, however, and that statute was never enforced. See Robert M. Ackerman &
Lance Cole, Making Corporate Law More Communitarian: A Proposed Response
to the Roberts Court’s Personification of Corporations, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 895, 998
(2016) (discussing former Connecticut statute). Moreover, in a twenty-year period
from 1983–2013 there were only forty-seven reported decisions discussing such
statutes. See Christopher Geczy et al., Institutional Investing When Shareholders
Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 105 (2015) (summarizing results of a
study of the statutes). The bottom line thus seems to be that these statutes have
had a very modest impact on the law.
Importantly, states typically adopted nonshareholder constituency statutes
not to promote corporate social responsibility but rather as part of a package of
anti-takeover laws intended not to regulate but to protect local corporations. See
Janette Meredith Wester, Achieving a Proper Economic Balance: Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes, 19 STETSON L. REV. 581, 616 (1990) (“States have enacted
antitakeover statutes, including nonshareholder constituency statutes, with the
clear aim of protecting local corporations.”). Instead of being a grass roots phe-
nomenon, the rise of nonshareholder constituency statutes is attributable mainly
to lobbying by corporate executives. See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analy-
sis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries
of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 31–36 (1991) (explaining
that corporate managers promoted nonshareholder constituency statutes); see
generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 57–59
(1993) (explaining that state anti-takeover statutes were supported by corporate
managers). The nonshareholder constituency statutes thus do not provide a
model for populist legal change.
133. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
134. In reviewing Simon Lazarus’ book, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS, John Ferren wrote
that:
Lazarus argues that federal judges are more likely than agency commis-
sioners to support a variety of interests against business because judges
are inevitably more independent. Only a portion of their job involves
business regulation, and an even smaller amount of their time concerns
a specific industry. Moreover, unlike agency commissioners, they are not
likely to be appointed at the behest of a particular commercial interest or
to develop “excessively cordial relationships” with industry representa-
tives after appointment to the bench (p. 247).
John M. Ferren, The Genteel Populists, 88 HARV. L. REV. 666, 672 (1975).
135. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2005) (explaining that Delaware
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As for the chances for legislative action at the federal level, popu-
lists tend to have the greatest political successes through legislative
action in the immediate aftermath of economic crises:136
[T]he federal role in corporate governance appears to be a case of what Robert
Higgs identified as the ratchet effect. Higgs demonstrated that wars and other
major crises typically trigger a dramatic growth in the size of government,
accompanied by higher taxes, greater regulation, and loss of civil liberties.
Once the crisis ends, government may shrink somewhat in size and power, but
rarely back to pre-crisis levels. Just as a ratchet wrench works only in one
direction, the size and scope of government tends to move in only one direc-
tion—upwards—because the interest groups that favored the changes now
have an incentive to preserve the new status quo, as do the bureaucrats who
gained new powers and prestige. Hence, each crisis has the effect of ratcheting
up the long-term size and scope of government.
We now observe the same pattern in corporate governance . . . . [T]the
federal government rarely intrudes in this sphere except when there is a
crisis.137
Unless there is another major financial crisis, the prospects of a fed-
eral statute mandating that corporations adopt a purpose broader
than shareholder wealth maximization seems dim.
IV. POPULISTS AND SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
CORPORATE ELITES
Let us assume that the Tea Party and Trump base opt to embrace
corporate social responsibility as a tool for achieving their agenda.
They insist on enlarging corporate purpose to include protection of
American jobs from the forces of globalization, an embrace of national
patriotism,138 defense of traditional cultural and social mores, and the
like. If the law allows directors to consider interests other than share-
holder wealth maximization, however, there is no guarantee that they
would actually do so. Even if law reform went further and mandated
that directors consider interests other than shareholders, there is no
guarantee that directors’ decisions would meet with populist
approval.139
has adopted “a classical or 19th century common law model of lawmaking,” under
“legal change is slow, standard-based, and incremental”).
136. ROE, supra note 17, at 49 (observing that populist political successes in the corpo-
rate governance context have “required a catalyst” such as a major economic
crisis).
137. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
269–70 (rev. ed. 2012).
138. For an interesting analysis of corporate patriotism, albeit from a progressive per-
spective, see YOSIFON, supra note 11, at 96–120.
139. Herein I assume for the sake of the argument that corporate social responsibility
can be an effective means of achieving social change. In fact, however, there is
good reason to be very skeptical of that assumption. For an excellent argument
that legal rules promoting corporate social responsibility have limited effect be-
cause “the existence of powerful product markets, capital markets, and manage-
rial labor markets restricts the options” available to corporate decision makers,
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The Southern Agrarians likely would have dismissed reliance on
the goodwill of corporate executives out of hand. Lyle Lanier spoke for
many when he argued that corporate owners and managers have “no
feeling of responsibility even for the physical welfare of individuals
dependent for a living upon the caprice of modern industry.”140 Rich-
ard Weaver believed large corporate bureaucracies could easily merge
with government to create a fascist or socialist economy.141 Richard
Ransom contended that restraints on such large corporations cannot
be accomplished through codes of ethics.142 The Agrarians would tell
modern populists that, even if we empowered corporate directors and
executives to consider the social effects of their decisions, the very na-
ture of the enterprise they serve eradicates feelings of benevolence
and empathy.143
Since the 1930s, there have been two further changes that make it
even less likely that the benevolence of corporate directors and man-
agers can be mobilized to advance the populist agenda and protect the
interests of those in the movement. First, there has been a dramatic
set of economic changes that have fundamentally altered not only how
large American corporations relate to the American people as workers
but also how they relate to them as investors and consumers. Second,
there has been a crucial divide in the worldviews, value systems, and
beliefs of the elites and the people. Taken together, these changes put
corporate elites solidly in opposition to populists, especially those
right of center.
A. The Changing Nature of Work, Investment, and
Consumption
We have already touched on the ways in which the changing na-
ture of work and the economy have been important factors in the pop-
ulist revival.144 Increasingly, elites and non-elites hold very different
types of jobs in very different industries, assuming the latter have jobs
see D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57
EMORY L.J. 985, 989 (2008).
140. KOLOZI, supra note 25, at 90 (quoting Lanier).
141. GENOVESE, supra note 84, at 81 (describing Weaver’s hostility to the “modern cor-
porate state”). Although Weaver technically was not a member of the Southern
Agrarians, he was a close and near-contemporaneous student of their work. See
generally RICHARD M. WEAVER, THE SOUTHERN ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. WEAVER
(George M. Curtis, III & James J. Thompson, Jr. eds., 1987) (exploring the intel-
lectual contributions of the Agrarians).
142. Ransom, supra note 83, at 70 (arguing that restraining large corporations could
not “be safely entrusted to the same legal sanctions and to the same codes of
ethics which may quite adequately control private enterprises and private
persons”).
143. See id. (discussing the Agrarian critique of business).
144. See supra notes 123–128 and accompanying text.
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at all.145 Modern oligarchs employ fewer people (especially fewer
Americans due to outsourcing) and hire mainly from the managerial
and knowledge classes.146 All of this has “elicited only derision, not
concern” from the elites.147
Changing investment patterns are also widening the divide be-
tween the working and managerial classes. Publicly held companies
and the widespread availability of retail investing made it possible for
working and middle-class Americans to invest in major corporations.
As The Economist has pointed out, however, the decline of IPOs and
the growing number of firms going dark means “fewer chances for or-
dinary people to put their money into a future Google.”148
Finally, consumption patterns are making elites less dependent on
non-elites. Traditional business leaders depended on the middle and
working classes as both consumers and employees, which gave them a
certain shared community of interests.149 Today’s oligarchs in finance
and tech are not so dependent. Not only are non-elites marginalized as
employees “in the new technocracy,”150 as we have seen, but the new
oligarchs are less dependent on the middle and working classes as
consumers.151
B. Divergent Views
The values of the elites (the Oligarchs and Clerisy, as Kotkin calls
them) and those of the non-elites have been diverging for several de-
cades. In his 1995 classic, The Revolt of the Elites, Christopher Lasch
identified the emergent split between what he called the New Elites
and the rest of society.152 Lasch identified several trends that have
accelerated in subsequent years. First, he argued, American elites had
become increasingly global, rejecting nationalism and patriotism, and
refusing to maintain ties to places or people.153 Today we refer to
those elites, as well as their global counterparts and those who aspire
to join them,154 as Davos Man:
145. KOTKIN, supra note 35, at 70 (noting that some observers “propose that the Amer-
ican middle and working classes have become economically passe´”).
146. See id. at 7 (describing this phenomenon).
147. Id. at 71.
148. The Endangered Public Company: The Rise and Fall of a Great Invention, and
Why It Matters, THE ECONOMIST (May 19, 2012), https://www.economist.com/lead
ers/2012/05/19/the-endangered-public-company [https://perma.unl.edu/L9X9-
PS4F].
149. KOTKIN, supra note 35, at 7 (describing these developments).
150. Id.
151. See id. (arguing that “the new Oligarchs [do not] actually require a large and
thriving middle class”).
152. LASCH, supra note 35, at 5 (describing the new elites).
153. See id. at 35 (arguing that the loyalties of modern elites are international rather
than regional, national, or local).
154. As Samuel Gregg notes:
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January is when the World Economic Forum (WEF) holds its annual confer-
ence at a Swiss mountain resort to “improve the state of the world.” More than
a business meeting for 2,500-plus globetrotting academics, executives, politi-
cians, and lobbyists, it is a tribal celebration for leaders who worship a holy
trinity of ideas: capitalism, globalization, and innovation. In a 2004 essay, Sa-
muel Huntington, who popularized the term “Davos Man,” described this
breed of humans as “view[ing] national boundaries as obstacles that thank-
fully are vanishing.” (And, yes, more than 80 percent of attendees at the WEF
conference are male.)155
As The Economist’s Schumpeter columnist observed in 2013,
“[o]rdinary folk trust Davos Man no more than they would a lobbyist
for the Worldwide Federation of Weasels.”156 This distrust took on
considerable political weight in the 2016 presidential campaign, as the
populists who voted for Trump recognized that a minority comprised
of “people from ‘anywhere’” ruled the majority of people who came
from “somewhere.”157
The first group . . . holds “achieved” identities based on educational and pro-
fessional success. Anywheres value social and geographical mobility. The sec-
ond group is characterised [sic] by identities rooted in a place, and its
members value family, authority and nationality.
Whereas Anywheres, whose portable identities are well-suited to the
global economy, have largely benefited from cultural and economic openness
in the West, he argues, the Somewheres have been left behind—economically,
but mainly in terms of respect for the things they hold dear. The Anywheres
look down on them, provoking a backlash.158
The disdain in which elites now hold non-elites was another criti-
cal emergent trend Lasch identified. As Christopher Lasch explained,
“the new elites, the professional classes in particular, regard the
masses with mingled scorn and apprehension.”159 Many of Lasch’s
new elites dismissed the masses’ values as “mindless patriotism, relig-
Davos Man isn’t limited to business titans, heads of multinational corpo-
rations, and people who work in financial markets. He also takes the
form of transnational officials who work in institutions such as the
United Nations or the European Commission in Brussels as well as peo-
ple employed by international NGOs. Nor will anyone be surprised to
learn that Davos Man enjoys the company of actors and celebrities.
Samuel Gregg, Davos Man, Globalism, and the Case for Free Trade, ACTON.ORG
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://acton.org/pub/commentary/2017/02/08/Davos-Man-global-
ism-and-the-case-for-free-trade [https://perma.unl.edu/6VMM-WHTE].
155. Gillian Tett, Davos Man Has No Clothes, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (Jan. 16, 2017),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/16/davos-man-has-no-clothes-globalization/
[https://perma.unl.edu/5H6T-29CW].
156. Davos Man and His Defects: The Global-Leadership Industry Needs Re-Engineer-
ing, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 26, 2013), https://www.economist.com/business/2013/
01/26/davos-man-and-his-defects [https://perma.unl.edu/D87H-VNS6].
157. The New Political Divide, and a Plan to Close It, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 25, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/books-and-arts/2017/03/25/the-new-political-divide-
and-a-plan-to-close-it [https://perma.unl.edu/Q84M-RZ3T] (describing a survey of
populism by David Goodhart).
158. Id.
159. LASCH, supra note 35, at 28.
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ious fundamentalism, racism, homophobia, and retrograde views of
women.”160
Middle Americans, as they appear to the makers of educated opinion, are
hopelessly shabby, unfashionable, and provincial, ill informed about changes
in taste or intellectual trends, addicted to trashy novels of romance and ad-
venture, and stupefied by prolonged exposure to television. They are at once
absurd and vaguely menacing—not because they wish to overthrow the old
order but precisely because their defense of it seems so deeply irrational [to
the new elites] . . . .161
This tension was perhaps nowhere more pronounced than with re-
spect to religion. When Lasch wrote over two decades ago, he opined
that “[a] skeptical, iconoclastic state of mind is one of the distinguish-
ing characteristics of the knowledge classes. . . . The elites’ attitude to
religion ranges from indifference to active hostility.”162
If anything, today’s elites have become even more hostile to relig-
ious values. As Samuel Gregg observes, the Davos Man’s moral creed
is “a me´lange of social liberalism, environmentalism, and a new order
of a borderless world. . . . [R]eligion is considered the refuge of fanatics
and anyone stupid enough to be skeptical of gender ideology and
techno-utopianism.”163
In contrast, modern right-wing populists are highly religious. Ac-
cording to a 2011 Pew Research Center analysis, for example, Tea
Party members were “much more likely than registered voters as a
whole to say that their religion is the most important factor in deter-
mining their opinions on . . . social issues.”164 Likewise, a subsequent
Pew analysis found that “white born-again or evangelical Christians
and white Catholics[ ] strongly supported Donald Trump.”165
Today’s elites thus hold non-elites in at least as much disdain as
did the elites of Lasch’s period. The Clerisy, in particular, scarcely
bothers to conceal its disdain for the traditional middle and working
classes.166 This disdain manifests itself in a variety of ways, perhaps
most notably through the increasing separation between the working
class and the elites.
160. Id. at 29.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 215.
163. Gregg, supra note 154.
164. The Tea Party & Religion, PEWFORUM (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.pewforum.org/
2011/02/23/tea-party-and-religion/ [https://perma.unl.edu/L4GM-LT3T].
165. Jessica Martı´nez & Gregory A. Smith, How the Faithful Voted: A Preliminary
2016 Analysis, PEWRESEARCH (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/11/09/how-the-faithful-voted-a-preliminary-2016-analysis/ [https://per
ma.unl.edu/VP6T-362F].
166. KOTKIN, supra note 35, at 71 (“Contempt for the middle orders is often barely
concealed among those most comfortably ensconced in the emerging class
order.”).
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The increasing geographical separation between the elites, on the
one hand, and the working class, on the other, with the former migrat-
ing to the coasts and large cities and the latter remaining in rural
areas, has been widely remarked.167 Even when they live in relative
geographical proximity, however, the elites are increasingly walling
themselves off from non-elites. As Joel Kotkin observed, for example,
“large sections of the [San Francisco] Bay Area . . . resemble a ‘gated’
community, where those without the proper academic credentials, and
without access to venture funding are forced into a kind of marginal
nether-existence.”168
C. The Probable Direction of Corporate Elite Social
Activism
Whether out of personal belief or as a marketing tool, the elites are
increasingly embracing a progressive world view.169 Oligarchs like
Salesforce.com CEO Marc Benioff, for example, promote “social activ-
167. See, e.g., Josh Kron, Red State, Blue City: How the Urban-Rural Divide Is Split-
ting America, THE ATLANTIC (Nov 30, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2012/11/red-state-blue-city-how-the-urban-rural-divide-is-splitting-ameri
ca/265686/ [https://perma.unl.edu/Q7NF-FWKF] (“The new political divide is a
stark division between cities and what remains of the countryside.”).
168. KOTKIN, supra note 35, at 45.
169. See Aaron K. Chatterji & Barak D. Richman, Understanding the “Corporate” in
Corporate Social Responsibility, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 34 (2008) (arguing
that “corporations can be pressured to invest their resources to advance progres-
sive causes, and progressive activists deserve praise for their several successes in
extracting socially desirable behavior from these profit-maximizing organiza-
tions”); Daniel Gross, Jamie Dimon Steps in It, SLATE (May 17, 2017), http://www
.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2017/05/jamie_dimon_steps_in_it.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/WFR7-GWV8] (“As a group, Fortune 500 companies today
are socially liberal, especially on areas surrounding diversity, gay rights, and im-
migration; they are unabashedly in favor of free trade and globalization, express
concern about climate change, and embrace renewable energy.”); R.R. Reno, The
Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2017, at 63, 65 (“Today,
large-scale global companies scramble to position themselves as agents of social
change.”); Kevin D. Williamson, Why Corporate Leaders Became Progressive Ac-
tivists, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/03/corp
orate-leaders-progressive-activists/ [https://perma.unl.edu/HNP3-KPWF] (“Far
from being agents of reaction, our corporate giants have for decades been giving
progressives a great deal to celebrate.”).
Popular culture critic Jordan B. Peterson has opined that:
It’s staggering to me to watch the corporate elite types kowtow to the
radical Marxists. They do it to virtue signal or because they’re feeling
guilty or maybe because they’re facing genuine pressure and don’t want
to stand up against it. But they’re playing a game that will punish them
intensely.
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ism among American chief executives.”170 As the Wall Street Journal
reported:
Mr. Benioff is among CEOs of companies, including Apple Inc., Bank of
America Corp., Walt Disney Co., Intel Corp. and International Business Ma-
chines Corp., that have begun pressuring lawmakers on social issues, often
with a warning: Change laws or risk losing business.
. . . .
What sets apart the new activist CEOs is how they use their names and
corporate muscle to campaign directly against specific laws governing social
issues, often on short notice, sometimes by threatening to withhold
business.171
In an important contribution to the legal literature on corporate activ-
ism, Tom Lin discusses in detail the widespread hostile reaction by
major corporations to North Carolina’s so-called “Bathroom Law” and
various early Trump administration initiatives.172 They serve as lead-
ing examples of what he calls “unprecedented contemporary corporate
social activism.”173
What is driving this shift? An important factor is pressure from
major investors. Institutional investors have long offered funds that
focus on corporations perceived as socially responsible,174 which gen-
erally has been understood to mean companies pursuing progressive
goals.175 A growing number of major institutional investors, however,
have embraced social activism in support of progressive goals with re-
spect to the funds they manage.176 BlackRock, for example, encour-
170. Monica Langley, Salesforce’s Marc Benioff Has Kicked off New Era of Corporate




172. Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1547–54
(2018).
173. Id. at 1537. Lin argues that corporate social activism is not necessarily partisan.
See id. at 1558 (arguing that “it is important to note that the new corporate social
activism is a nonpartisan phenomenon” as it “can affect causes on both the Left
and the Right” of the political spectrum). But most of the examples of corporate
activism he cites are in support of progressive social causes, and Lin himself
states that his “Article aspires to provide an early, hopeful, and workable frame-
work for thinking about, speaking about, and acting on the new corporate social
activism and its role in changing our businesses, our laws, and our communities.”
Id. at 1605.
174. See George Djurasovic, The Regulation of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds, 22
J. CORP. L. 257 (1997) (discussing such funds).
175. See Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the Antebellum Cor-
poration to the Twenty-First Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033, 1083 (2015) (noting
the development of “funds specially organized to engage in socially responsible
investing” that “use shareholder proposals for broader progressive ends”).
176. See Frederick H. Alexander, Whose Portfolio Is It, Anyway?, 47 STETSON L. REV.
311, 327–28 (2018) (“There has certainly been movement in the institutional in-
vestor community to focus more on ‘environmental, social, and governance’ is-
sues, ‘corporate social responsibility,’ and ‘socially responsible investing.’”).
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ages companies to pursue excellence in environmental and social, as
well as governance, areas.177 BlackRock CEO Laurence Fink sent a
letter in 2018 to CEOs of the firm’s portfolio companies, in which he
posited that companies need to be responsive to stakeholders, includ-
ing consumers and communities, as well as investors, and pursue en-
vironmental, social, and governance goals to achieve “sustainable
growth.”178 But this simply pushes the question further up the corpo-
rate finance food chain since it fails to explain why investment fund
managers like Fink are pursuing that agenda.
To some extent, corporate executives may also be responding to
perceived consumer and labor demand. In particular, millennials ap-
parently prefer to work for and purchase from companies that are per-
ceived as socially and environmentally responsible.179 “To attract
promising young employees in many parts of America and to woo to-
day’s customers, the argument goes, companies must project a corpo-
rate ethos that goes beyond profit.”180 Even Walmart is embracing
socially progressive stances, despite the risk of “alienating its core cus-
tomers, who often live in more conservative-leaning rural and subur-
ban communities.”181 Social media clearly has been in a factor in this
development, as it has given tech-savvy activists unprecedented abil-
ity to mobilize pressure on recalcitrant corporations.182 But this raises
two new questions. First, why have so many millennials embraced cor-
porate social activism? Second, why are corporations catering to their
preferences as opposed to those of the Yeomanry?
177. See Michael R. Siebecker, Political Insider Trading, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2717,
2731 (2017) (quoting BlackRock’s statement on ESG factors).
178. Laurence Fink, 2018 Letter to the CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK (Jan. 17,
2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/investor-relations/larry-fink-
ceo-letter [https://perma.unl.edu/5JPS-5GGV].
179. Sarah Landrum, Millennials Driving Brands to Practice Socially Responsible
Marketing, FORBES (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahlandrum/
2017/03/17/millennials-driving-brands-to-practice-socially-responsible-market-
ing/#16beba3d4990 [https://perma.unl.edu/RWB7-D3YS] (“Millennials prefer to
do business with corporations and brands with pro-social messages, sustainable
manufacturing methods and ethical business standards.”); Why Millennials
Choose CSR, MORNING FUTURE (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.morningfuture.com/
en/article/2017/08/16/millennials-csr-companies-responsible/60/ [https://perma
.unl.edu/8WQD-QCCD] (“92.1% of those surveyed think that working for an envi-
ronmentally and socially responsible company is important. So important that
CSR has become one of the criteria considered when applying for the right job.
More than 50% of respondents are willing to give up 20% of their salary to work
for a company that makes corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts.”).
180. Langley, supra note 170.
181. Sarah Nassauer, Walmart Takes a Stand on Guns, Gay Rights to Get People to
Like It More, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/walmart-
takes-a-stand-on-guns-gay-rights-to-get-people-to-like-it-more-1530805106
[https://perma.unl.edu/A5A4-UFW6].
182. Lin, supra note 172, at 1543–47.
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Finally, thought leadership on this issue emanates from the Cler-
isy, a group that has embraced using corporate social activism to drive
progressive causes. Progressive corporate law professors, for example,
have long advocated corporate social responsibility.183 More generally,
progressive lawyers and activists have joined forces to advance social
goals through corporate law reform and internal corporate governance
battles.184 Again, however, the question of why the Clerisy has done
so remains unanswered.
The most probable explanation is the divergence in values between
the New Elites and the members of the Tea Party and the Trump
base.185 The New Elites—and those who aspire to join them—have
increasingly embraced progressive policy preferences, especially on
environmental and social issues.186 No Fortune 100 CEOs contributed
to Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, for example, but
eleven gave to Hillary Clinton.187 More generally, “liberal groups ac-
183. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Cor-
porate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 640 (2001) (“The ‘new’ corpo-
rate social responsibility, or progressive corporate law, movement promises to
grow and occupy center stage in the coming decade.”); Kellye Y. Testy, Linking
Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1227, 1228–29 (2002) (“Under various labels, including ‘progressive corporate
law,’ ‘good governance,’ ‘social disclosure,’ and ‘socio-economics,’ a diverse group
of legal academics has trained its attention on problems perceived to be related to
corporations’ lack of attention to interests other than short-term maximization of
shareholder profits.”).
184. See Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and
Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 120
(2004) (“Some progressive corporate lawyers and activists sought to reward these
constituencies—employees, consumers, or the larger public—by reforming the in-
ternal mechanisms of corporate governance through codetermination, or exerting
their voice through politically motivated proxy fights in corporate elections.”).
185. See supra section IV.B (discussing that divergence). Tom Lin explains the expan-
sion of corporate social activism results “in large part” from “a confluence of three
larger, interconnected changes in business, law, and society. More specifically,
the convergence of government and private enterprise, the maturation of corpo-
rate social responsibility efforts, and the expansion of corporate political rights
have all advanced the growth of contemporary corporate social activism.” Lin,
supra note 172, at 1573. The difficulty with that explanation is that it fails to
account for the increasingly partisan nature of corporate social activism.
186. See Jonathan Chait, Poison Penn, NEW REPUBLIC (May 5, 2010), https://newrepub
lic.com/article/74833/poison-penn-0 [https://perma.unl.edu/9V4G-ULR9] (“The
parties are more responsive to their elites, who lean more socially liberal and
economically conservative than the voters.”); KOTKIN, supra note 35, at 9 (noting
that progressive “tendency now relies on an alliance between the new Oligarchs,
increasingly concentrated in places like Silicon Valley and Wall Street, and their
Clerical allies”).
187. Rebecca Ballhaus & Brody Mullins, No Fortune 100 CEOs Back Republican Don-
ald Trump, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/no-fortune-
100-ceos-back-republican-donald-trump-1474671842 [https://perma.unl.edu/
D3CG-DFR2]. On the other hand, as the authors note, about a third of Fortune
100 CEOs donated to Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign. Id.
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counted for eight of the top ten ideological causes of the ultra-rich, and
seven of the ten congressional candidates most dependent on money
from such people were Democrats.”188 Even one of the progressive
movement’s favorite whipping boys—David Koch—publicly self-iden-
tifies as “a social liberal.”189
None of this is likely to surprise right-wing populist activists. Their
paleoconservative counterparts have long identified “the members of
the material elite [who] control the nation’s largest corporations” as
being among “the primary purveyors of the assault on America’s na-
tional and cultural identity.”190 Instead of depending on the kindness
of the new elites, workers will more likely shift into a mode of active
resistance to the Oligarchy and the Clerisy. This resistance will inevi-
tably find legal expression outside the bounds of corporate law. In-
stead, it likely will look more like the Southern Agrarian program as
articulated by Ransom.191
V. CONCLUSION
This Article was motivated by the Schumpeter column raising the
question of whether rising populist sentiment would lead to changes
in corporate purpose. I conclude that significant change in the law of
corporate purpose is unlikely. The right-of-center populist movement
seems more likely to pursue changes in general regulation than in the
legal rules governing corporate social responsibility. Moreover, as cor-
porate social activism becomes more common it will likely trend to-
wards support of progressive rather than populist policies,
encouraging populist efforts to regulate corporations directly rather
than encouraging them to rely on the good will of corporate managers.
188. KOTKIN, supra note 35, at 10.
189. Scott Wong, Koch Brother: I’m a “Social Liberal”, THE HILL (Dec. 14, 2014), http://
thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/227091-koch-brother-im-a-social-liberal [https://per
ma.unl.edu/5NDH-X8A7].
190. KOLOZI, supra note 25, at 173–74. See also Reno, supra note 169, at 5 (opining
that “the corporate tsunami that recently swept through Indiana after it passed a
Religious Freedom Restoration Act made clear the link between global capitalism
and progressive clear-cutting of traditional religious culture and morality”).
191. See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text (describing Ransom’s program).
